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What makes for a well-functioning corporate board? In this Article I
argue that one important condition is that board members must
understand and agree upon the group's objectives and its roles. If a
corporate board of directors (Board) does not agree on what it is
supposed to do; or, worse still, if Board members disagree about the
Board's mission and its implementation, then the Board is likely to
become dysfunctional-inefficient and ineffective. The Board's
missions, however, may be mixed and their forms of implementation
may conflict. In this case, the balance between the two missions must be
established, and it is that balance on which Board members must agree
and follow. This Article examines the Board's two roles: One is the
Board's role as advisors to Chief Executive Officers and corporate
management (CEOs); the other is the Board's role as supervisors of
CEOs. This Article discusses the many ways in which the two roles
differ and the balance that must be achieved between them to create a
functional Board.1
Understanding the balance between the Board's roles depends on the
corporation's history, present condition, its business, and the personality
of the actors. These factors are manifested by the Board's culture, that
is, the implicit assumptions that Board members make in their
interactions with each other and with the other actors in the corporation.
These assumptions are neither specified nor debated, nor clarified,
except in times of crises. Usually such assumptions are taken for
granted, just as we assume in this country that businesspersons do not
hire assassins to eliminate their competitors.
This Article suggests that Board efficiency varies, depending on the
extent to which their members understand and agree on the dual roles
they should play as advisors and supervisors of their CEOs, and the
appropriate balance between these roles. In addition, Boards must trust
* Professor of Law, Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University Law School.
1. For a paper discussing a similar dichotomy, see Renee B. Adams, The Dual Role of
Corporate Boards as Advisors and Monitors of Management: Theory and Evidence (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2 41581.
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their CEOs and corporate management to tell the truth and abide by their
promises. 2 When these two roles of advice and supervision are well
balanced, and when Boards can rely on their CEOs for information and
compliance, then Boards are likely to be functional. When these roles
are either misunderstood; or when Board members, the CEO,
management, and the shareholders disagree about the extent and priority
of their respective roles, Boards are more likely to fail in executing their
mission.
Part I of this Article discusses the differences between the Board's
advisory and supervisory functions. Part II then describes the history of
the Board's roles as advisors and supervisors, its power relationship with
CEOs and shareholders, and the law's view of these roles and
relationships. The Board's initial function was to supervise CEOs,
subject to the control of majority shareholders; this function then
evolved, and the Board began to advise CEOs, subject to CEO and
management control. Currently the Board's roles are changing again, in
an effort to reach a better equilibrium between the two.
Next, Part III examines the law's view of the Board's role. Part IV of
the Article analyzes specific Boards that did not function efficiently, the
consequences of their failures, and recounts a story of a Board that
transitioned from inefficiency to efficiency. This part highlights the
effect of the CEO's personality on the Board's behavior. Part V
discusses the rise of activist shareholders, such as hedge funds and
individual shareholders, and the effect of their activism on the Board's
dual roles. Part VI concludes by offering some guidelines with respect to
the Board's relationship with CEOs and the Board's combined advisory
and supervisory functions.
I. ADVISING AND SUPERVISING
The roles of advisor and supervisor differ in two fundamental ways.
First, there is a different balance of power among advisors and their
advisees, as compared to the balance of power between supervisors and
those whom they supervise. Advisors do not have the last word
regarding the subject on which they give advice; the final decision is in
the hands of their advisees. Conversely, supervisors have the last word
on the subject they supervise. Therefore, each role involves a different
power relationship between the Board and its CEO. When the Board
advises-the CEO and management ultimately decide. When the Board
supervises-the Board is the ultimate decision maker. The distinction
2. Id.
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between advising and supervising does not mean that the roles of
advisors and supervisors cannot overlap. Advisors can influence the
final decisions of those whom they advise, and supervisors can give
advice while refraining from dictating the decision. Nonetheless, the
parties act with these two roles in mind, and note the distinctions
between them.
Additionally, in any one corporation, the balance between the two
roles is not rigidly observed. The balance may change depending on the
outside environment, the corporation's business, and the personality of
the actors. Furthermore, although the law does not dictate the precise
balance, to be sure, the parties act under the shadow of the law. Because
law is not fine-tuned to particular situations and is not as changing as
human relationships, the model of power relationships that the law
provides affects the background against which the parties act and their
patterns of behavior, but not the details.
Second, advising and supervising result in a different balance of trust
among the parties. In this context trust is defined as a reasonable belief
that the other party will tell the truth and fulfill its promise. 3 If verifying
truth and assuring reliance involve low cost, as some relationships and
situations do, no trust or a very low level of trust is required. In other
relationships, involving a very high cost of verification, trust is crucial.
In an advisor-advisee relationship, the higher the advisor's expertise and
the lower the advisee's understanding are, the more power the advisor
commands. In such situations the advisee must either trust the advisor or
terminate the relationship.
When Boards act as advisors to CEOs, the CEOs have the upper hand.
CEOs need not vest a high degree of trust in their Boards. The CEOs are
often as knowledgeable as their advisory Board members are, and
perhaps even more knowledgeable than some of them. CEOs are more
informed about the affairs of the corporation than their Board is.
Therefore, the CEO's degree of reliance and dependence on the Board is
not necessarily very high, especially when the CEOs can take Board
advice or leave it.
In contrast, if Boards act as supervisors, the degree of trust that the
Boards must vest in the CEOs is far greater than the trust CEOs must
vest in their Boards. This is because the CEOs and management possess
the information on which the Boards act, that is, the general operations
of the corporations, their structure, and their accounting. Without this
information there can be no effective and true supervision. Verifying the
necessary information independently of the CEOs and management is
3. TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD
49 (2006).
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very costly. 4 Therefore, Boards must trust CEOs for the information on
which the Boards base their final decisions. Furthermore, corporate
CEOs do not have a legal duty to provide the Boards with information,
if the Boards do not ask for it. In fact, if the Boards do not ask for
pertinent information, the Boards, not the CEOs, might be faulted for
violating their duty of care.
In sum, the power balance between Boards and CEOs may depend on
whether the Boards are advisors or supervisors. But even if the Boards
exercise supervisory functions, they must trust CEOs far more than the
CEOs must trust the Boards (in both capacities). The balance of power
between Boards and CEOs, however, depends on two additional factors.
The first factor is who hires whom to the position of power. The second,
complementary factor is who can remove whom from that position. On
this score, history can tell the story.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HISTORY
A. The early 1900s. The rise of United States corporations in the early
1900s posed issues concerning the status of corporate Boards. Boards
were chosen by the majority shareholders; more often Board members
were the majority shareholders. 6 The Board's supervisory powers over
the CEOs and management were fairly decisive. In fact, many Board
members were the CEOs and management of the corporations. The
Board's powers were usually only tested when minority shareholders
complained. During this time period, directors' roles were analogized to
that of trustees. 7 The Board's powers were limited by the articles of
association and corporate laws, and the Board owed fiduciary duties to
the shareholders, including the minority shareholders-as trustees would
to their beneficiaries.
4. See id at ch. 4.
5. See Adams, supra note I (analyzing the consequences of the board's dual role as an advisor
and monitor of management in the context of both a sole board system, as in the United States, and the
dual board system, as in various countries in Europe. The manager in a sole board system faces a trade-
off concerning the amount of information he discloses to the board. If he reveals his information he gets
better advice, but is exposed to the board's judgment about his abilities. The board may choose to pre-
commit to reduce its monitoring of the manager in order to encourage the manager to share his
information. Adams derives implications for the optimal monitoring intensity of the board as a function
of managerial ownership and the manager's career concerns and tests them in a cross section of Fortune
500 firms. The empirical evidence is consistent with the model's prediction that monitoring first
decreases and then increases as ownership and tenure increase).
6. ROBERT SOBEL, THE AGE OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 26-27 (2d ed 1984) (1974); see also id.
197-207; JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY, A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 58 (2005).
7. Daugherty v. Poundstone, 96 S.W. 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906).
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This strict interpretation, however, gave way to a more flexible one.
In the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,8 the main issues revolved
around the role of Henry Ford, the director-majority-shareholder-CEO
of the company. The Board argued that it had the power to reinvest the
excess profits in expanding the corporation's operation rather than
distributing all the profits as dividends-as Ford requested. Had the role
of the Board been that of a trustee, the Board would have had to
distribute all corporate profits to the beneficiaries-shareholders. The
minority-the Dodge Brothers-argued that the Board had no choice
but to declare dividends of almost the entire amount of the profits.9 The
court held otherwise, stating that the Board had the discretion to
withhold dividends and reinvest the profits in expanding the
corporation's operation.10 When the majority shareholder also occupies
the position of CEO and Board director, then the minority shareholders'
powers become quite limited. It was assumed that the interests of the
corporation (and consequently, the minority shareholders) were well
served, and that assumption-clearly expressed in Dodge-was well
founded. Thus, during this period the Board had power over the CEO
because in most cases they were the one and the same.
B. The 1970s. During the evolution of publicly-held corporations,
share ownership became dispersed among small shareholders. The
Boards of the 1970s emerged as advisors to CEOs.'1 The transformation
was slow and perhaps not clearly noticed. CEOs in some corporations
still represented the majority or controlling shareholders. These Board
members were usually the founders of the corporations and their
families.12 However, as the number of shareholders rose, the
shareholders no longer held the majority of the shares or the controlling
votes in the corporations. The CEOs became highly paid employees
assigned to manage the operation of the corporation's business. With
dispersed shareholder population, the CEOs began to choose the Board
members rather than the reverse. The Board's role became advisory
rather than supervisory. Board members were indeed knowledgeable in
operating large enterprises. Board members usually included a member
of the law firm that served as outside counsel. Sometimes, inside
counsels were members of the same firms as well. 13 Similarly, Boards
8. 170 N.W. 668,683 (Mich. 1919).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 684.
11. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 15
(2004).
12. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 6, at 104; see also id. 113.
13. HAROLD M. WILLIAMS & IRVING S. SHAPIRO, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 18 (1979).
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included a partner of the investment banker that served as underwriter of
the corporation's securities distribution. 14 Thus, some Board members
played the role of advisor to their client corporations. Other Board
members understood that their role as directors was to advise
management. During this period CEOs rather than Boards were viewed
as the guardians of corporations and their public shareholders.
C. The 1980s. In the 1980s problems arose concerning CEO and
management conflicts of interest. Insider trading issues emerged under
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. Before the 1980s, Rule lOb-
5 existed and was dormant. It was in the 1980s that the rules began to be
used by the courts. Concerned about liability for insider trading, many
lawyers left their positions on Boards, especially when these lawyers'
law firms were managing large pension funds for their partners, or were
serving as trustees of clients' large trust assets. 15 They did not wish to be
privy to the financial situations in the corporations and be accused of
then using insider information, or have to avoid trading in the stocks of
these corporations.1 6 Yet the slow disappearance of lawyers from Boards
did not change the Board's role as advisors.
During this period, however, one element of a supervisory corporate
Board did appear. This element was derived from the Investment
Company Act of 1940.17 The Boards of investment companies were
required by law to have a number of "independent" directors, that is,
Board members who were not affiliated with the management of the
corporation, whose function is similar to that of the corporate CEO. 18
The importance of these independent directors grew when the CEOs
acted in conflict with their corporate interest and the Board's
independent directors could approve these conflict of interest
transactions. In such activities, the consenting Board members were
acting as supervisors. They had the legal power to disapprove such
transactions. In practice, however, the power of approval did not
significantly change the role of the Board or its members. Neither did
the courts change their attitude in any fundamental way. The Business
Judgment Rule sheltered Boards from liability (barring conflict of
interest and lack of care, narrowly defined, in most cases). 19 The courts
14. Id.
15. Blackmar v. Lichtenstein, 438 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mo. 1977), rev'd, 578 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir.
1978).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
17. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -64 (2006).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006) (prohibiting a registered investment company from having
more than 60% directors "who are interested persons" of the company).
19. E.g., In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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did not focus on whether Board members were advisors, or whether they
had various affiliations with the CEOs as long as they were not
corporate officers, and as long as they were not interested in the
transactions that they approved.
D. Historical attempts to shore up the Board's supervisory functions.
Professor Jeffrey Gordon noted that "[b]etween 1950 and 2005, the
composition of large public company boards dramatically shifted
towards independent directors, from approximately 20% independents to
75% independents. The standards for independence also became
increasingly rigorous over the period. The available empirical evidence
provides no convincing explanation for this change." The writer explains
the developments as a shift "to shareholder value as the primary
corporate objective" and "the greater [informative power] of stock
market prices." Therefore, "independent directors are more valuable
than insiders" and "less committed to management and its vision."
20
In the year 1984 one observer wrote:
Most modem analyses of the internal power structures of the large
corporations have found the top insiders to be the power and decision-
making center, with the outside directors usually serving in an advisory
role. This is based on the factors just mentioned-command over
resources, special skills, plus the tendency of the top insiders to build up a
congenial board. Also, board traditions in the United States make
outsiders invited guests, not policy makers. They have fiduciary and
advisory duties and responsibilities, but normally they behave passively
and reactively. There is considerable variation in the level of activity and
power of outside directors, but this general pattern of power is well-
accepted as a fact in the corporate world. Such a version of corporate
control is consistently reported in Conference Board studies of the
structures of boards and the evolution of board power.21
E. The 2000s. Currently, history is repeating itself; though not
precisely, as it never does. By law, the roles of Boards have been
shifting towards supervision, even in large corporations with dispersed
small shareholders or large passive shareholders. In practice, Boards
have retained their advisory role, or, put differently, have not acquired
sufficient backing to exercise a meaningful supervisory role. CEO
discretion may have been shorn in some areas, but they were left with
discretion focusing on maximizing profits. 22 In fact, Boards were put in
20. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
21. Edward S. Herman, The Limits of the Market as a Discipline in Corporate Governance, 9
DEL. J. CORP. L. 530, 533 (1984).
22. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 1535-41.
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an impossible position.
Professor Fanto has interpreted Board behavior by comparing their
behavior to that of whistleblowers. 23 He argues that corporate scandals
have occurred in corporations which had an inner circle that perpetrated
and benefited from the fraud.24 The Boards and advisors that worked
closely with these corporate inner circles were reluctant to object to the
fraud, and remained uninvolved in these activities. 25 In contrast,
whistleblowers that cared about the corporations did not fare well.
[T]he contrast between the behavior of the executives, board members,
and corporate advisors who were reluctant to challenge the corporate
misbehavior, and the small number of corporate whistleblowers who did,
points to a disturbing social psychological reality that has been
overlooked in the discussion and reforms addressing the corporate
scandals: namely, a group dynamic that binds group members together
and blinds them to their failings and abuses. This social psychological
reality. .. ,long known to and studied by social psychologists, is a basic
cause of the corporate scandals .... 26
Thus, regardless of pressures in publicly-held corporations, the
equilibrium between the Board's two roles of advisors and supervisors
has not been well-balanced or effective to date.
III. THE LAW
A. Corporate governance reflects the political structure of the United
States. Boards are similar to legislatures and CEOs are similar to the
executive branch. Boards have the duty to lay out general guidelines for
the management of their corporations, and CEOs are required to execute
these general guidelines. In some respect this division of functions
makes sense. In terms of their objectives and functions, however,
corporations may differ from the political system. The political system is
concerned with excess of power. The three branches of government are
designed to maintain a balance of power. Each branch is assigned
functions, and is restrained from encroaching on the functions of other
branches. This is especially important in gray areas, which are prone to
the "creeping" acquisition of power.
Notwithstanding its resemblance to the political structure, the balance
of power in corporations differs from that in the political arena.
23. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner
Circles, 83 OR. L. REv. 435 (2004).
24. Id. at 435.
25. ld. at 435-36.
26. Id. at 441.
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Corporate governance is policed by government law enforcement and by
private sector gatekeepers: attorneys, accountants, in-house counsels,
ombudsmen, and others to ensure compliance with the law and internal
rules.27 But corporate governance lacks a court system to maintain the
balance between the CEOs and the Boards. Courts are reluctant to draw
the line, and are subject to far more legislative pressures in designing the
balance.
In fact, the courts have averred that they cannot and will not deal with
the details of the corporate functions. They announced the constraints on
their power in the Business Judgment Rule. If we compare the Business
Judgment Rule with the courts' decisions for refraining to deal with sub
judice matters28 we find that the judicial self-restraint in the corporate
arena is far greater than in the political arena. This withdrawal from
decision-making and the absence of precise rules on the division
between the Board's advising and supervising functions may be
desirable, especially because more than the political system,
corporations are many and varied. This different judicial approach,
however, allows for inappropriate division or balance between the
Board's two functions.
Courts have recognized the low level of the Board's supervisory role.
For example, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation,29 involving a claimed breach of directors' duty of care
regarding employee violations of law, a Delaware court discussed
directors' duties to monitor corporate operations. The court held that
"absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor
senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the
integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the
company's behalf., 30 The court stated that "a director's obligation
includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is
adequate, exists." 31 In finding the directors not liable, the court said,
"Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is
predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the
corporation,.., only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to
exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
27. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006).
28. FDIC v. Castetter, No. 94-55974, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22366 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1996); see
also Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
29. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
30. Id. at 969 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130-31 (1963)).
31. Id. at 970.
2008] 509
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol.77
reasonable information and reporting system exits-will establish the
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability."
32
B. The markets develop their practices in the shadow of the law. Yet,
law might reflect changing market perceptions of the Board's functions.
Market pressures might induce lawmakers to restrict harmful corporate
actions after they threaten the financial system, such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (the Act), which imposed a stronger supervisory role on
Boards. 33 In practice, however, little can be changed if the same power
balance between Boards and CEOs persists. Boards cannot act as
supervisors unless they have the shareholders' backing and unless they
can trust the information they receive from CEOs and management. As
long as the CEOs have contacts with the shareholders and choose the
proposed list of Board members on which shareholders are invited to
vote, the Boards are not likely to become more supervisory. The recent
rise in activist shareholders does not necessarily increase the Board's
supervisory power, unless the Board members are appointed by the
shareholders. In such a case, the Board represents the controlling
shareholders and in that capacity can supervise the CEO.34
C. Where does the law end and social controlling mechanisms begin
to take its place? It seems that market discipline may help Boards define
and balance their dual roles. The recent termination of two CEOs
(although with significant amounts of "farewell" money) could indicate
pressure on Boards to restrain corporate risk-taking, especially risk-
taking that may endanger the financial system.35 The court-confirmed
story at Disney Corporation has caused the disappearance of both
Michael Eisner and Michael Ovitz from the scene, at least for some
36
time. In the mutual funds area the Boards have been imposed with
more supervisory tasks accompanied by shadow liabilities, and more
transparency as to their own Board discussions.37 And even though
substantive discussions can be carried on before the formal meetings and
32. Id. at 971; see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364-65 (Del. 2006) (following Caremark).
Cf Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazdbal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 81 (2006) (discussing the determination of which parties in which corporate scienter resides for
purposes of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)).
33. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.))
34. ScoTI GREEN, SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 216 (2005).
35. See Greg Farrell, Bear Stearns CEO to Retire Following Subprime Woes, USA TODAY, Jan.
9, 2008, at I B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industriesfbanking/2008-O1-08-cayne-
bear-steamsN.htm; see also Jim Zarroli, Citigroup CEO Prince Falls to Subprime Debacle, NPR, Nov.
5, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=15995002.
36. Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2006, at 26.
37. Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing,
I BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. LAW 165, 174 (2006).
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formal meetings can then be staged, the added concern about legal
requirements renders Boards more sensitive to their supervisory role.
In 2002, with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Boards acquired
greater supervisory powers. 38 The Act imposed structural requirements
on Boards and allocated powers among Board members, accompanied
by liabilities. Yet, the disagreement about the functions and role of
corporate Boards is by no means over.
IV. SAMPLING DYSFUNCTIONAL BOARDS
A. Some Boards neither advise nor supervise but instead attempt to
micro-manage. The following example demonstrates the elements of
dysfunctional Boards. One type of a dysfunctional Board is a Board that
neither advises nor supervises but attempts to manage the details of the
operation. There are Boards that interfere in the management of their
corporations, either in the details or in the fundamental business
strategy-the domain of CEOs. One example is the case of Westbrae.
As one expert noted: "Westbrae's problem was ... a dysfunctional
board of directors that suppressed growth and investments. We took off
the cuffs and let that growth potential flourish. ' '39 When Westbrae
merged with Hain, the deal "brought Hain into categories like soy milk
and provided it with an excellent management team, says Irwin Simon,
president and CEO of Hain." 40 That also released Westbrae of its
restrictive Board.
Another example of a dysfunctional Board is the Board of Hewlett-
Packard Corporation. In this Board, in addition to disagreement over the
corporate business strategy, there was a serious rift among the Board
members, the controlling shareholders, and the CEO. The rift led a few
Board members to anonymously tip the media on internal discussions.
41
The CEO then hired a private detective to identify these members.42 The
detective tapped the telephones of Board members and engaged in
illegal activities. 43 Neither the corporate legal advisers nor other Board
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.)); Dan A. Bailey & J. David Washburn, The Effect of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Directors and Officers, in THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 WITH ANALYSIS
9 (2002).
39. Steve Dwyer, Desperately Seeking Synergies, PREPARED FOODS, May 1, 1999, at 19.
40. Id.
41. Grace Wong, Now, HP Is a Criminal Case, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 5, 2006, http://money.cn
n.com/2006/10/04/news/companies/hp california/index.htm; see also HP General Counsel Ann Baskins
Resigns, AFX INT'L FOCUS, Sept. 28, 2006.
42. See Wong, supra note 41.
43. Id.
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members seemed to be able to control these developments, which led to
a public scandal.44 However, because the employees of the corporation
and its culture are exceptionally trustworthy, trusting, and productive,
the corporation managed to overcome the Board's poor composition and
behavior, survive, and flourish. It could be the exception, however.
B. Some dysfunctional Boards remain entirely passive: neither
advising nor supervising. For example, the Board of Walt Disney Co.
remained passive in the face of an inappropriate choice of the
company's president by a controlling Chairman. That led to the unusual
strong active signal of the shareholders. "On March 3, 2004, in dramatic
and historic fashion, shareholders of Walt Disney Co. (Disney) delivered
a powerful message to management at their annual election: a 'startling'
forty-three percent withheld their vote for incumbent Michael Eisner as
Chairman of the Board.,
45
C. Some dysfunctional Boards fail to supervise or control fraudulent
CEOs and fraudulent corporate culture. The CEO of Hollinger
International ruled the corporation without much regard to its Board.
Conrad Black and his executives were not the only people who were on
trial in this case. The spotlight was also on the conduct of Black's
directors, lawyers and auditors who failed on several occasions to
question or sound the alarm about a number of transactions that were at
the heart of the case. The Black trial painted a picture of a dysfunctional
board of directors who "skimmed" key documents and never questioned
deals that screamed for scrutiny. Hollinger International's board was
handpicked by Lord Black to include aging government celebrities such
as Henry Kissinger and Richard Perle and they operated more like a
political salon than public company board. These directors trusted Lord
Black and almost never challenged him. The embarrassment and lawsuits
they have suffered as a result of this case is the final nail in the coffin to
compliant boards.
46
Professor Hamilton discussed the cases of corporations that "engaged
in a fair amount of fraud., 47 In most, if not all, the exercise of the
Board's supervisory role was weak, or did not exist. One of these
corporations was WorldCom, Inc., where the CEO was actively
44. Id.
45. Seth W. Ashby, Note, Strengthening the Public Company Board of Directors: Limited
Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot vs. Required Majority Board Independence, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 521, 521 (2005).
46. The Black Verdict, BREAKING NEWS FROM GLOBEANDMAIL.COM, July 16, 2007, http://ww
w.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.2007071 l.wblackdiscussion0712/BNStory/Front/?pageR
equested=all.
47. Robert W. Hamilton, The Seventh Annual Frankel Lecture Address: The Crisis in Corporate
Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 19-26 (2003).
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manipulating the corporate books.4 8  Another was Adelphia
Communications Co., which had grown to be "the nation's sixth-largest
cable operation," and in 2002 announced an off-balance sheet debt of
$2.3 billion; the CEO and other officers were charged with looting the
company. 49  Yet another example was Qwest Communications
International Inc.; "the dominant local telephone company in fourteen
states from Minnesota to Washington," experienced an improper
booking of $1.16 billion. 50 "Joseph P. Nacchio, the former Qwest CEO,
sold $ 230 million of Qwest stock before the value of the shares
collapsed., 51 Global Crossing, founded in 1997, built an extensive
undersea phone network.52 The founder, who controlled the company,
"went through six CEOs in five years." 53 While the company went
bankrupt in January 2002, the founder of the company, profited to the
tune of $735 million by selling the company's stock in time.54 In each of
these instances, the company's Board did not act to prevent these
activities.
D. Group dysfunction. Chris Blake and Bob Harris described group
behavior signals of dysfunctional Boards. 55 I suggest that this behavior
represents the failure of a group to agree on the balance between its
position as advisor and supervisor. Consequently, the Board is unable to
set or focus on its group's goals. It has too many agendas, and
experiences difficulties in making decisions. These behavioral problems
seem to relate to the lack of clarity about the balance necessary in
performing the Board's duties.56 In addition to--and perhaps because
of-this lack of clarity, the behavior of the members signals
dysfunctional boards as well. Such behavior include inability to work
together as a team, destructive criticism, personality clashes and
infighting, too much analysis and too little action, and unequal division
of the work.57 These difficulties demonstrate another imbalance, an
inability to combine different views and be enriched by diversity. 58 In
48. Id. at 20-22.
49. Id. at 22-24.
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 25.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Chris Blake & Bob Harris, Dysfunctional Boards-Symptoms and Cures, CANADIAN
ASSOC., Jan. 2005, http://www.axi.ca/tca/Jan2005/guestarticle1I.shtml.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Effective Governance: Managing Board Dynamics, http://govemance.tpk.govt.nz/how/dyn
amics.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2008).
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these cases, again, one underlying missing factor is the balance between
the advisory and supervisory capacities of Boards.
E. Personality of the CEOs. Corporations that are unsupervised
appear to invite persons with a certain psychological and personality
makeup. When power vests in one party without supervision or
counterbalancing power, we can expect dysfunctional governance.
Power develops reduced inhibitions in people. This tendency "involves
acting on your own desires in a social context without considering the
effects of your actions. It implies a heightened sensitivity to your own
internal state and also a reduced sensitivity to other's interests and
experiences." 59 Executives with such a personality "are enamored with
risk taking and whose fatal flaw is unbridled confidence in their own
ideas and abilities combined with a willingness to push, and frequently
exceed, the legal limits of corporate executive action." 60 They crave to
control large enterprises; the larger the enterprises become, the more
powerful the CEOs become. Inevitably, the supervisory function of the
Boards declines with the growth of the enterprises. This psychological
makeup is manifested in the behavior of the actors, be they CEOs or
Board members.
Thus, under such a CEO, Tyco International, Ltd., became a very
aggressive deal-machine (acquiring about seven hundred companies
between 1998 and June 2002).61 The CEO "was indicted for evading
more than $ 1 million in New York state sales taxes on art purchases.,
62
He "regularly used Tyco funds for various personal purchases ....
Shortly [after the indictment], Tyco reported a $ 2.32 billion loss for its
fiscal third quarter, a number that itself may have been based on
questionable accounting." 63 This CEO and a former CFO were indicted
on "grand larceny, enterprise corruption, and falsifying business
records." 64 To the extent that Boards could affect the choice of corporate
CEOs, these Boards failed to choose the right kind of persons.
F. Where were the Boards in these fraud cases? They either did not
know but should have known of the manipulations and
59. Marguerite Rigoglioso, Behaving Badly May Be Natural at the Top, STANFORD BUS. MAO.,
May 2006, available at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/newsbmag/sbsm06O5/knowledgepower.html
(interview with Deborah Gruenfeld).
60. Edwin J. Greenlee, in Keeping Up with New Legal Titles, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 169, 185 (Amy
Atchison et al. 2006) (reviewing DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005)).
61. Hamilton, supra note 47, at 26.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id.; see also Robert L. Dilenschneider, When CEOs Roamed the Earth, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2005, at B2.
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misappropriations, or they knew of the wrongful acts and did nothing to
prevent them. After the discoveries and indictments of these frauds,
when the regulators, investigators, and prosecutors entered the scene,
only then did the Boards take action, and remove or force the resignation
of their CEOs. But even then, the Boards did not necessarily enforce
discipline. For example, Tyco's CEO took a personal loan from the
corporation and "[r]epayment of [the CEOs' private loan] was
subsequently forgiven by Tyco's board of directors without advising its
shareholders." 65 The Board's advisory function was pushed to the point
of subservience.
V. ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS
Individual activist shareholders emerged in the 1980s. Their fight to
control the Boards, (and the CEOs), and consequently the corporations,
has been reflected in law. These attempts gave rise to poison pills and
other mechanisms designed to thwart activist shareholders. Wresting
control of Boards from CEOs is no easy matter; it takes significant funds
and time. It also is constrained by the law.6 6 In contrast, incumbent
CEOs and their Boards can use corporate assets to fight off proxy
solicitations by activist shareholders.
Not all activist shareholders aim at benefiting all shareholders or the
corporate enterprise. Some activist shareholders are accused of draining
the corporate assets and exiting the scene. 67 Some are accused of betting
against the acquisition and success of their target corporations. 68 Some
have no stake in the corporations but rather borrow shares to vote
without risk to their equity. 69 State courts are less adamant in imposing
supervisory roles on Boards, and more attendant to the arguments and
65. Hamilton, supra note 47, at 27.
66. William J. Donoher & Richard Reed, Employment Capital, Board Control, and the Problem
of Misleading Disclosures, 19 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 362 (2007).
67. Francesco Guerrera, Post-Enron Reforms Favour Activists, Says Moody's, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 24, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/l b2c3fl 8-227a- 1I dc-ac53-000b5df1062 I.html?ncl
ick check= 1; see also Murakami Gets Two Years in Jail in Livedoor Scandal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July
19, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/l9/business/insider.php.
68. Thomas J. Donohue, President & CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Presentation at the
Equities Magazine Conference: Shareholder Activism: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Apr. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/speeches/2006/060421 7 shareholdersactivism.htm; see
also Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, When (Not) to Listen to Activist Investors, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan. 2008, at 2, 23-24.
69. Kara Scannell, How Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes; SEC and Others Fear Hedge-
Fund Strategy May Subvert Elections, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 116978080268188623.html.
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desires of CEOs.7 °
The importance of activist shareholders is the effect of their activism
in strengthening the supervisory role of the Boards. Judging by the
reaction of Martin Lipton, a lawyer who speaks for management and
protects its entrenchment (according to his statement), activist
shareholders may have some effect. Lipton's argument is that the
"[shareholder-]owners are bent on wrecking the companies they have
bought and upon which they hope to build a prosperous retirement ....
[Lipton] seems to see shareholders as infants who should stay in their
cribs and leave big corporate decisions to wise men on the board, in the
comer suite and, of course, in law offices." 71 Thus, there is a movement
and public pressure to involve shareholders in corporate governance. It
is not surprising that this movement is strengthened by the falling share
prices on the one hand and the enormous compensation for CEOs on the
other.
To the extent that activist shareholders occupy positions on Boards or
nominate persons who share their views, they can strengthen the Board's
supervisory role, provided these shareholders have a stake in the
corporation's success. The very activism of these shareholders may
strengthen the Board's supervisory role over CEOs. This activism might
be achieved by gaining the power to name proposed directors without
the expenses of proxy fights, or acquiring the right to amend the articles
of associations to achieve this goal, or simply voting "No" on particular
proposed directors.
VI. CONCLUSION: REACHING FOR THE BALANCE
Boards must play two roles: advisors and supervisors to their CEO
and their corporation. These two roles are usually combined and draw on
each other. Boards do not, however, have the tools necessary to perform
either function well. To advise well, one must know what is going on in
the corporation. To supervise well, one must know what is going on in
the corporation and take some advisory action as well. It is not enough
for Boards to demand results without giving general directives; without
suggesting and designing an area of discretion to those who execute the
tasks. Thus, in both roles Boards must receive sufficient and adequate
information: not too little but also not so much as to drown Board
members in the details. Boards must be populated by persons with
diversified expertise to both advise and supervise the corporation's
70. See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
71. Gretchen Morgenson, Memo to Shareholders: Shut Up, N.Y. TIMES, Febt 11. 2007, sec. 3, at
1, available at http://milwaukeewomeninc.org/pdfs/NYT021107.pdf.
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operations. Yet, notwithstanding the scandals of the 1990s that seem to
continue into this century, the independent directors did not strengthen
the supervisory function of Boards.72
The Board's supervisory requirements cannot be achieved without a
measure of supporting power. Experience has shown that CEOs cannot
and should not represent the corporate shareholders' interests or the
interests of the corporations. The attempt to clone CEOs as shareholders
by awarding CEOs stock options was an admired theoretical success,
and a disastrous failure in reality. The shameful behavior of a fair
number of powerful CEOs of very large corporations, and the incredible
rise in CEO compensation regardless of investors' losses, demonstrate
that CEO identification with shareholders' interests usually does not
exist. Therefore, Boards must supervise CEOs. Yet, where will the
board's power and precise information come from?
CEOs are fighting the pressure to increase Board supervision, and
have had supporters among the legislators, some of the courts, and in
academia. A number of quick removals of CEOs in recent months
73
might signal a change in the Board's perceptions. However, as long as
the CEOs, rather than the Boards, have contact with the large
shareholders, and as long as the CEOs hand-pick the Board members, it
is doubtful that Boards will be able to supervise. The exercise of
supervision backed by the threat of legal liability is not very effective.
Besides, the courts are not likely to send directors to jail for slack
supervision of their CEOs. The courts recognize that
[W]hen a company fails, it's usually because of the chief executive's
mistakes. But don't expect the CEOs to 'fess up. CEOs offer every
excuse in the book, says Fortune-a bad economy, market turbulence, a
weak yen, hundred-year floods, perfect storms and other forces outside
their control. Among the mistakes that actually lead a company to fail are
fear of the boss by underlings, the lust for acquisitions, a dysfunctional
board of directors, "overdosing on risk," ignoring mistakes and being a
"slave to Wall Street." 74
Regardless of the merits of resorting to judicial enforcement of
fiduciary duties, it is doubtful whether the Board's stronger supervisory
role would emerge by judicial caveat. The structure of fiduciary law may
not be suitable for designing specific duties to variable environments,
72. There is one model which may have becn the source of the idea of "independent directors"
and may continue to provide a model in the future. That is the model of the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -64 (2006).
73. Farrell, supra note 35; see also Zarroli, supra note 35.
74. Tom Walker, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution Business Press Column, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
May 21, 2002.
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such as corporate businesses. The courts' tradition also might not be so
easily or quickly changed. Today's courts avoid interfering in, and
imposing duties on, either CEOs or Boards when their duties are closely
related to operating corporate businesses. The courts do not impose
duties on directors or officers, for example, to restructure the
corporations even though their existing structure contributes to legal
violations by the employees of the corporations.
75
Presently, there are suggestions to highlight the status of the CEOs as
fiduciaries and invite the courts to impose strict fiduciary duties on
them. One commentator argued: "Chief executive officers wield
enormous power in the modem corporation.... When they and other
senior officers perform well, the enterprise and its stockholders are
likely to flourish; when they misbehave-as many have in recent
years-the company, stockholders, creditors, employees, and others in
society suffer significant lOSS." ' 76 Professor Lucian Bebchuk has argued
for opening the Board's nomination power to large shareholders. These
proposals have met with strong opposition by the Business Roundtable,
a strong and influential conservative organization for corporate
management. 77
One clear-cut solution to the problem of dysfunctional Boards is to
remove Boards. That was the way in which an airline in New Zealand
was rescued. The dysfunctional Board just left.78 Other suggestions are
less extreme. They include, for example, standards proposed by the New
York Stock Exchange (the Exchange) board of directors, which include
the selection of "a majority of independent directors," 79 who will serve
on audit, compensation, 8 1 and nominating 82 committees (for listed
75. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
76. Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2005) (footnote omitted); id. at 1600-02 (the arguments are
aimed at distinguishing between the fiduciary duties of CEOs and Board members. Both are fiduciaries,
but each group plays a different role in the corporate governance. Failure to differentiate the duties of
officers, who manage daily corporate operations, from directors, who more remotely monitor corporate
affairs, stems from a puzzling failure to address an even deeper issue in corporate law: What exactly is
the theoretical and conceptual basis for the widespread claim that corporate officers owe fiduciary duties
to a corporation and its stockholders?).
77. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business
Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557 (2005).
78. Phil Pennington, The Most Reluctant Rescue Ever, EVENING POST (WELLINGTON), Oct. 6,
2001, at 18.
79. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.01 (2009).
80. See id. § 303A.06 (referencing Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees,
Exchange Act Release No.47,654 (Apr. 9, 2003)); see also Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed
Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654 (Apr. 9, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,818 (Apr. 16,
2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.1OA-3(b)(I)(i) (2008)).
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companies). "Independent" Board members are defined as those who
have "no material relationship" with the corporation. 83 The nature of the
material relationship is defined by the Boards,84 but the definition of
"independent director" excludes, among others, former employees and
outside auditors who personally worked on the audit for three years after
the employment or service provision ends.
85
In addition, independent directors must conduct meetings without the
CEO-management directors. 86 Listed companies must have an audit
committee, 87  and the audit committee independent directors'
compensation must be the only remuneration they receive from the listed
company. 88 In addition, equity compensation plans must be subject to
shareholder approval, with limited exceptions including employment
inducement awards and merger-related exemptions. 89 Listed companies
must adopt corporate governance guidelines, and disclose these
guidelines and the charters of their most important committees
(including the audit committee, and the compensation and nominating
committees if applicable), 90 and must adopt and disclose a code of
business conduct and ethics.91 The Exchange may issue a public
reprimand letter to a company that violates a listing standard.92
This proposal had "widespread support, [with] strong endorsements
from President Bush, [former] SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, members of
Congress, CEOs of listed companies, institutional investors, state
pension funds, representatives of the financial-services industry, and
organizations such as the Business Roundtable and the Council of
Institutional Investors." 93 The proposed standards were approved in
2003.94
81. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, § 303A.05(a).
82. Id. § 303A.04(a).
83. Id. § 303A.02(a).
84. Id. § 303A.02(a) cmt.
85. Id. § 303A.02(b)(i)-(ii).
86. Id. § 303A.03.
87. Id. § 303A.06.
88. See id. (referencing Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act
Release No.47,654 (Apr. 9, 2003)); see also Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,654 (Apr. 9, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,818 (Apr. 16, 2003) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(i)(ii), (iii) (2008)).
89. Id. § 303A.08.
90. Id. § 303A.09.
91. Id. § 303A.10.
92. Id. § 303A.13.
93. Hamilton, supra note 47, at 43-44.
94. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of
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There are also weighty arguments to allow institutional investors
simply to vote: No. Professor Joseph Grundfest argues for this
approach.
95
Despite the fact that it is impossible to determine with precision the
cause and effect relationship between shareholder threats to "just vote no"
and CEO or policy changes at targeted firms, the fact that CalPERS and
other institutional investors were able to identify several major firms on
the verge of significant corporate management changes or restructurings
is consistent with the proposition that institutional shareholders can
accurately target corporations that are in extremis and at which
fundamental reform is warranted.96
Renee Jones has shown that extralegal mechanisms such as markets
and social norms fail to provide adequate safeguards against corporate
mismanagement and opportunism. 97 Yet, there are many forces that
seem to turn Boards into more active supervisors. These are actions by
large investors, reactions by the markets, threats of criminal sanctions
for joining wrongful actions, the rise of CEOs who refuse to compete on
fraud, the media, and public opinion. If institutional investors turn to the
Boards rather than to the CEOs, and if markets demonstrate and strongly
express the public's opinion and outrage, as it seems to have done
recently, then the Boards might better balance their supervisory and
advisory roles over CEOs and exercise their supervisory functions more
actively.
POST SCRIPT
This Article was written at the beginning of 2008. Since then, the
financial and economic crisis has deepened. The number of CEOs that
were asked to leave or were removed has grown. The number of large
institutions that were acquired by other institutions or by the
government, and whose CEOs are likely to be replaced, has risen as
well. It seems that the Boards have become more active and assertive.
When their corporation is on the verge of bankruptcy Board members
hesitate to resign, concerned about damaging their own reputations.
Then they are pressed to act: inviting CEOs to leave and replacing them
Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No, 48,745
(Nov. 4, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,156-66, 64,162 (Nov. 12, 2003).
95. Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993).
96. Id. at 934 (emphasis in original).
97. Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board. Promoting Accountability In
Corporate Governance, 92 IowA L. REV. 105 (2006).
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is one such action. It seems that a number of Boards have taken this step.
If the trend continues, Boards may become more aggressive and begin
supervising CEOs more than they did in the past. Thus, when
concentrated shareholding is missing and courts exercise a "hands-off'
attitude, then perhaps the pressure of public opinion will move Boards to
act as supervisors of CEOs. Whether this is the wave of the future
remains to be seen.
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